CYB-005 Data exported from Salesforce instances through compromised Salesloft Drift OAuth tokens, per Google Threat Intelligence Group

ID: CYB-005
Category: Cyber Cyber incident linked to an AI incident
Disclosed: 2025-08 unverified
Systems: Salesforce customer instances; Salesloft Drift third-party application (OAuth tokens)
Harm type: Data theft via third-party OAuth tokens
Status: reported
Google Threat Intelligence Group published the analysis. GTIG is a threat-intelligence team, not the vendor, so "reported" is the closest existing status value.
CISA KEV: Not applicable: no CVE is cited for this incident
Vendor: Salesforce
Product: Salesforce; Salesloft Drift

Summary

Google Threat Intelligence Group reports that an actor it tracks as UNC6395 targeted Salesforce customer instances through compromised OAuth tokens associated with the Salesloft Drift third-party application, from as early as Aug 8 through at least Aug 18, 2025, and exported large volumes of data. GTIG assesses the primary intent was harvesting credentials.

Techniques

Technique-level mapping, an editorial judgment made by the method.

T1528 Steal Application Access Token
T1199 Trusted Relationship

MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs and names: © The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK terms of use

Controls

Controls that could prevent, detect, or support recovery from this kind of failure. Mappings are editorial judgments made by the method, not findings about what any party should have done.

NIST AI RMF

Not mapped. AI RMF mapping is optional for cyber incidents.

NIST SP 800-53

AC-6 Least Privilege
IA-5 Authenticator Management
AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement
SI-4 System Monitoring

Human-approval (JCR) checkpoint

not applicable

Correlated incidents

Co-occurrence, not cause: each link records something the two incidents share, as its rationale and source state. It does not say one incident caused the other. Links are written on one record; the other record shows the same link marked derived.

AI AIA-017 "ForcedLeak": Salesforce Agentforce prompt injection via Web-to-Lead, per Noma Security

same vendor

Both concern Salesforce customer data reached through a connected integration: compromised Salesloft Drift OAuth tokens, per GTIG, and an Agentforce prompt-injection chain that sent CRM data to an expired domain, per Noma.

Source: noma.security https://noma.security/blog/forcedleak-agent-risks-exposed-in-salesforce-agentforce/

Sources

cloud.google.com primary link checked 2026-10-31, HTTP 200
Google Threat Intelligence Group. Activity Aug 8–18, 2025; the post's publication date is not in the verified facts, so the disclosure month is marked unverified.
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/data-theft-salesforce-instances-via-salesloft-drift

Corrections

No corrections recorded.

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